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This paper compares and contrasts the determinants of the market
for skyscrapers in Chicago and New York from 1885 to 2007, using
annual time series data. I estimate the factors that determine both the
number of skyscraper completions and the height of the tallest building
c o m p l e t e de a c hy e a ri nt h et w oc i t i e s .Iﬁnd that each city responds
diﬀerently to the same economic fundamentals. Also, regressions test
for and ﬁnd the presence of strategic interaction across the two cities.
I also estimate the eﬀects of zoning regulations on height. Compared
to New York, Chicago’s zoning policies signiﬁcantly reduced the height
of its skyline.
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1The character and quality of any city can be told from a great
distance by its skyline, but these buildings do more than advertize
a city. They show the faith of many in its destiny, and they create
a like faith in others (Shultz and Simmons, 1956, p.12).
1 Introduction
Since the mid-1880s, the skyscraper has been an important part of the Amer-
ican historical and economic landscape. As Ford (1992) writes, “For nearly
eight decades the skyscraper was largely an American phenomenon and
seemed to symbolize the energy, enthusiasm and optimism that character-
ized the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries”
(p. 180). Yet despite their importance in American history, surprisingly
little work has been done in economics on investigating the causes and con-
sequences of building height.
As historians, architects and journalists have discussed, the skyscraper is
a unique good because of the grandness of its technological sophistication, its
symbolic importance (as an aesthetic element, and for advertising and “po-
sitional” purposes) and because collectively skyscrapers generate an entirely
new entity—the skyline. This skyline serves to advertise the economic might
of a city, beyond the power of any one building contained within it.1
Since the early days of the skyscrapers invention, New York and Chicago
have been two of the world’s premier skyscraper cities. By 1929, New York
and Chicago contained 68% of the nation’s buildings that were 20 stories
or taller (Weiss, 1992). Each city was a testbed for innovation and each
used height as a way to house rapidly growing populations and to adver-
tise its growing wealth. Currently, New York and Chicago hold 56.6% of
the nation’s buildings that are 239 meters (785 feet) or taller. Of the ten
current tallest buildings in the U.S., four are in Chicago and four are in
New York (six would be in New York, if the Twin Towers were included)
(http://www.emporis.com, 2010).
By the second half of the 19th century, both cities were participating in
1A study by Heath et al. (2000) demonstrates that the nature of a skyline’s complexity
and articulation can aﬀect emotional well-being. They ﬁnd, “The strongest inﬂuence on
preference, arousal, and pleasure was the degree of [skyline] silhouette complexity, with
higher silhouette complexity associated with higher levels of...preference and higher arousal
and pleasure” (pps. 541-2).
2a national network of trade and capital ﬂows (Rosenbloom, 1996). Given
the ability of labor and capital to move to locations where the returns are
greatest (Glaeser and Gotlieb, 2009), we would expect that this would lead
to some degree of competition between these two leading cities.
The literature on regional growth, however, has generally been silent on
strategic interaction. Davis and Weinstein (2002) summarize the three main
theories in regard to economic geography: increasing returns, random growth
(Gibrat’s Law) and locational fundamentals. None of these areas include any
direct measures of inter-regional competition per se.
More recently regional science studies have investigated “the formation
of policies designed to promote local economic development, often explicitly,
but certainly implicitly, in competition with other territories” (Cheshire and
Gordon, 1998, p. 321-322). In this vein, governments speciﬁcally design
tax policies, infrastructure investments or land use regulations to lure busi-
ness activity away from one region to another. But these types of direct
government interventions generally did not exist in the 19th and early 20th
centuries. Today these policies are often limited to speciﬁc projects, such as
sports arenas (Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000) or tax abatements for speciﬁc
corporations (Glaeser, 2001).
With the rise of big business and the centralization of corporate headquar-
ters in places such as New York and Chicago, real estate developers naturally
compete against each other to lure businesses to their new buildings. Early
technological innovations, such as steel-cage construction and elevators, per-
mitted the ﬁrst generation of real estate developer competition with regard
to skyscrapers.2 Builders incorporated these new technologies to improve the
quality of tenant life, reduce susceptibility to ﬁre, and to house more space
on a given piece of land.3 A skyscraper is thus “a machine that makes the
2Over the 20th century, builders have introduced such things as air conditioning, ﬂuo-
rescent lighting, better wind bracing, and computerized elevator systems. More recently
builders are “going green” to reduce the use of resources (Pogrebin, 2006). To the best of
my knowledge, however, no work has aimed to measure the rate or value of technological
change in regard to skyscrapers. See Landau and Condit (1996) for a detailed chronicle
of the evolution of skyscraper technology in the late-19th and early-20th century. Articles
such as those in Science Illustrated (2009) detail more recent innovations.
3Another important technological consideration was that of foundation preparation.
Tall buildings have to be stabilized below ground to prevent settling. Chicago and New
York generally faced diﬀering subsoil conditions and thus the ﬁrst generation of engineers
devised diﬀering solutions to foundation preparation. A detailed discussion of this is
beyond the scope of this paper. See Barr et al. (2010) for a discussion for New York. See
3land pay” (Gilbert, 1900, p. 643).
For the tenants, new buildings also provide agglomeration beneﬁts in
addition to advertising and status beneﬁts (such as through naming rights
or through the status of being in a well-known building, built by a famous
architect, for example). In short, developer competition has meant better
buildings and increased competition to improve a city’s relative position.
A good example of this is provided in a recent Wall Street Journal (2010)
article, which writes,
[A]s the world economy rebounds and competition heats up among
ﬁnancial centers, the availability for modern oﬃce space will play
a part in determining winners and losers.
“I think it’s dangerous, because people need facilitates, and there
is no place to go,” says New York’s Larry Silverstein, the de-
veloper of three oﬃce towers at the World Trade Center....Mr.
Silverstein notes that 60% of the buildings in New York City are
more than 60 years old. “For the most part, I think it serves as
a depressant not to have ﬁrst-class facilities available at the time
[tenants] want to move to them,” he says (p. 2).
Historically, skyscrapers, therefore, embody two types of competition:
regional competition for employment and industry growth, and competition
among builders themselves to have a place within a “height hierarchy.” That
is, skyscrapers can be thought of as “positional goods” (Frank, 1985) due to
psychological feelings of local pride and the apparent innate desire of humans
to engage in conspicuous consumption (or investment) to achieve social status
within a social hierarchy (such as has been modeled in Helsley and Strange,
2008).
Competition, however, can lead to two possible eﬀects, depending on
the nature of this competition. On one hand, height in two cities might
be strategic complements (Barr, 2010; forthcoming). If developers use their
buildings to place themselves in a favorable position in the height market
or urban hierarchy then builders will positively respond to the decisions of
builders in the other city—thus creating a positively sloped reaction function.
On the other hand, increasing the amount of building space will have
the aﬀect of reducing the price of space and thus, in the vein of a standard
Peck (1948) for Chicago.
4Cournot model, the best response function will have a negative slope. This
work here aims to test which eﬀects might be present.
Despite the importance of New York and Chicago in regard to both sky-
scrapers and regional competition, little work in economics has directly in-
vestigated these issues. This work aims to ﬁll this gap by comparing and con-
trasting the factors that have determined skyscraper frequency and heights in
New York and Chicago since 1885. By investigating these two cities, we can
get a sense of the degree to which skyscraper activity is location-speciﬁco r
not, and the degree to which these two city’s skylines are a result of strategic
interaction.
This work investigates the following questions:
• What are the most important drivers of the skyline?
• Which of the two cities is more “proliﬁc,” controlling for the underlying
economic environments and building regulations?
• Is there evidence that the skylines have been shaped by inter-regional
competition between New York and Chicago?
• Chicago, unlike New York, placed outright height caps on their build-
ings. Did these caps signiﬁc a n t l yr e d u c et h es i z ea n ds c o p eo fC h i c a g o ’ s
skyline vis a vis New York? In other words, were height restrictions
binding?
Clearly, the term “skyscraper” can have diﬀerent meanings depending on
the context. For example, a skyscraper can be deﬁned based on its relative
height compared with nearby buildings, or it can be deﬁned based on tech-
nological considerations (i.e., if built with a load-bearing steel cage and with
an elevator). However, to simplify the analysis in this paper, a skyscraper
here is deﬁned based on two perspectives. The ﬁrst is based on a ﬁxed height
(for New York I use 90 meters as the cut oﬀ; for Chicago I look at 90 meter
and 80 meter cutoﬀs).4 Second, I also look at the tallest building completed
480 meters is used as a cutoﬀ to increase the number of years with positive observations.
Because of building height restrictions in Chicago there are several years without any
“skyscraper” completions. Regressions using a 90 meter cutoﬀ were also run (results
presented below). Using the log of one plus the number completions as the dependent
variable, I do not ﬁnd large diﬀerences in coeﬃcient estimates if I use an 80 or 90 meter
cutoﬀ. Unless otherwise noted for the remainder of this paper a “skyscraper” in Chicago
will assumed to be 80 meters (about 23 ﬂoors, on average) or taller.
5in each city each year since 1885. Since builders often use their skyscrapers
for advertising (be it their corporations or their own egos), if there exists a
competitive eﬀect across cities, then presumably it would most likely appear
at the extreme height level.
Based on the time series data for New York and Chicago from 1885 to
2007, here is a brief summary of the ﬁn d i n g s .I nr e g a r dt ot h ed e t e r m i n a n t s
of the respective skylines, I ﬁnd that in general economic and policy vari-
ables explain a large fraction of the variation in the height decisions of the
two cities. However, broadly speaking, New York’s responses to supply and
demand variables are more elastic than Chicago’s. Chow tests also show
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients.
Ia l s oﬁnd evidence for interaction eﬀects across cities. That is to say, the
evidence suggests that New York height decisions have impacted Chicago’s
height decisions and vice versa, controlling for other determinants of the
skyline. For all four variables (New York’s height and count, and Chicago’s
height and count), I ﬁnd evidence of both strategic complementarity and
substitutability across cities. In regard to zoning, Chicago’s decision to cap
height has had an impact on the height of its skyline, compared to New York
City and compared to Chicago’s history without building height restrictions.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews
the relevant literature. Then section 3 discusses the history of interactions
between the two cities, as well as their respective policies on building height.
Following that, section 4 gives estimation results for the determinants of
skyscrapers in the two cities. Finally section 5 oﬀers a discussion of the results
and some concluding remarks. An appendix provides additional information
on the sources of the data.
2 Relevant Literature
To the best of my knowledge there is no work within economics exploring
the economic determinants of building height in Chicago, nor is there any
comparing New York to Chicago.5 In regard to zoning, there is also no work
on how building height regulations have either directly or indirectly aﬀected
5There is, of course, work on land values, land use, and the Chicago oﬃce market,
all of which are related to skyscraper height. Land value work includes Hoyt (1933) and
McMillen (1996). Studies on the Chicago oﬃce market include Mills (1990), Colwell, et
al. (1996) and Abadie and Dermisi (2008).
6the height of skylines across cities.6
Perhaps the most cited work on the economics of skyscrapers in New York
is that of Clark and Kingston (1930). Their objective was to estimate the
economic height of a “typical” oﬃce tower in Manhattan as of 1929. They
conclude that a 63 story building would provide the highest return using land
prices, construction costs and rent data from 1929.
More recently a game-theoretic model of building height has been pro-
vided by Helsley and Strange (2008). They observe that record-breaking
height is often “clumpy,” with records often broken in rapid succession. In
addition, they observe that across cities, the tallest building is often much
taller than the surrounding buildings. These facts suggest the developers may
engage in height races, such as that observed between 40 Wall Street and the
Chrysler building in 1929. Their model shows how strategic interaction can
result in the construction of buildings that are economically “too tall,” in
the sense that the height contest can dissipate proﬁts from construction.
These two works, however, only, investigate skyscraper height for only one
or two builders. They do not analyze the broader market for height. In this
vein Barr (2010) looks at the market for height in Manhattan over the period
1895 to 2004 by investigating the time series of the number of skyscraper
completions and the average height of these completions. The paper ﬁnds
that there has been no upward trend in average heights over the last century;
this provides evidence that, within Manhattan, ego-driven height does not
appear to be a systematic component of the skyscraper market.
Barr (forthcoming) is the only work that looks at the determinants of
building height, at the building level, in Manhattan over the 20th century.
The aim of this work is to test for the possibility of localized strategic in-
teraction (i.e. to see if spacial interaction within a city varies at the block
level) and to test for the eﬀects of building height regulations. The evidence
suggests that height competition is localized across both time and space, and
only exists when the opportunity cost of competition is relatively low. On
average, during periods of height competition, we see builders adding about
5o r6e x t r aﬂoors to stand out among the surrounding buildings.
Since New York never directly limited building height, it’s important to
see how its zoning regulations (discussed below) may have altered the skyline.
6Papers such as and Bertaud and Brueckner (2005), and Glaeser, et al. (2005) investi-
gate the eﬀect of land use regulations on the construction and cost of housing. McDonald
and McMillen (1998) study how Chicago’s 1923 ordinance aﬀected land values.
7The ﬁnding in Barr (2010) is that zoning rules in place between 1916 and
1960 in midtown Manhattan, for example, reduced building height by 115
feet (about 9.5 ﬂoors) on average. Since 1961, if builders are able to purchase
air rights and they take advantage of amenity bonuses, average height has
only dropped by about 1 ﬂoor as compared to the years with no zoning.
3 New York and Chicago
3.1 Economic Interactions
Clearly New York and Chicago directly beneﬁted from the exchange of goods
and services, capital and ideas.7 Chicago was ﬁrst platted in 1830 in antic-
ipation of the construction of a canal that would connect Lake Michigan
to the Mississippi River. The Illinois and Michigan Canal was eventually
completed in 1848, the same year a Chicago’s ﬁrst railroad, the Galena and
Chicago Union (Cain, 1998). With the settling of Chicago and the open-
ing of the Erie Canal in 1825, Chicago and New York’s economies became
linked. Chicago became the urban hub of the old northwest, as it was the cen-
tral marketplace for the vast hinterland’s agriculture and natural resources
(Cronon, 1991; Cain, 1998).
These goods were then shipped via the Erie Canal and railroads to New
York, where they were then sold along the east coast or were shipped to Eu-
ropean markets. Finished products and immigrants travelled west. Eastern
merchants and investors provided Chicago and the region with capital for
land development, construction and business growth (Haeger, 1981; Cronon
1991).
Chicago’s Great Fire of 1871 spurred even more real estate related interac-
tions. Since the ﬁre swept away most of Chicago’s downtown, new methods
of ﬁre-proof construction and tall building were implemented in the 1880s
(Schultz and Simmons, 1959). This knowledge was then transferred to New
York, where steel construction was introduced in 1889.
7Interestingly, there does not appear to be a detailed account regarding the degree to
which New York and Chicago engaged in trade. Accounts such as those in Haeger (1981)
and Cronon (1991) describe the growth of Chicago and the Old Northwest. To some
degree they chronicle the extent to which eastern capitalists and entrepreneurs invested in
the region; but they do not provide speciﬁc measurements of the urban-level current and
capital accounts between the two cities.
8Architects, engineers and builders who ﬁr s t“ c u tt h e i rt e e t h ”o nC h i c a g o ’ s
ﬁrst generation of skyscrapers where employed in New York as well. This
interaction has lead Zukowsky (1984) to write:
Chicago and New York—these are often thought to be the two
great superpowers of American architecture. Architects consider
each city to have its own style, its own way of shaping its local
environment, its own individualistic contributions to the history
of architecture Yet these contributions were not developed in iso-
lation. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries there has been,
and still is, a considerable amount of competitive interactions be-
tween architects, contractors, and developers in both cities (p.
12).
The list of past and present interactions is long, and can be the subject
of a whole book, but here I just list a few important examples. In the early
period, perhaps Chicago’s most famous skyscraper architect, Louis Sullivan,
designed one of his signature buildings in New York (Bayard Building, 1899).
Builder and skyscraper pioneer, George Fuller and his ﬁrm built skyscrapers,
such the Monadnock (1893) and the Rookery (1888) buildings in Chicago,
and the New York Times (1904) and Flatiron (1902) buildings in New York
City, which was also designed by one of Chicago’s most famous architects,
Daniel Burnham.
Competition between the two cities in this early period was keen. For
example, the Chicago Daily Tribune (March 11, 1900) reports a typical case
of interest:
T h en e w e s tt h i n gi nt h er a c i n gﬁeld is the skyscraper. It
involves Chicago and New York, and as usual Chicago is in the
lead. A novel race of skyscrapers has been in progress for nearly a
year at Cedar Street and Broadway, were two sixteen-story oﬃce
buildings are going up on opposite corners....The American Ex-
change National Bank Building is being erected on the northeast
corner by a New York ﬁrm of builders, and on the northwest cor-
ner Chicago contractors are putting up the St. Lawrence Build-
ing....The Chicago ﬁrm celebrated its triumph today by hanging
out a sign announcing that its building will be ready for occu-
pancy in May. The New York ﬁrm admits that it can only ﬁnish
in time for the autumn renting (p. 2).
9In the 1920s, architect Raymond Hood, who resided in New York, de-
signed both the Chicago Tribune Tower (1924) and the New York Daily
News Building (1929). After World War II, German-born architect Lud-
wig Mies van der Rohe, head of the architecture department at Chicago’s
Illinois Institute of Technology, designed one of New York’s most famous
modernist buildings, the Seagram Building (1958). The architecture ﬁrm
Skidmore, Owings and Merrill (SOM), founded in Chicago in 1936, has de-
signed many buildings in the two cities, including the Sears Tower (1974)
and the John Hancock Tower (1969) in Chicago and the Lever House (1952)
and One World Wide Plaza (1989) in New York. Lastly, New York based
builder Donald Trump, who has built many skyscrapers in New York, in 2009
completed the 92 story Trump International Hotel and Tower (designed by
SOM) in Chicago.
3.2 New York’s Zoning and Policies
New York’s ﬁrst “skyscraper,” the Tower Building, was completed in 1889,
four years after Chicago’s ﬁrst, the Home Insurance Building. After that,
steel-cage construction in New York became common place. The ﬁrst gen-
eration of skyscrapers were not subject to any height or bulk regulations;
and developers felt free to build very tall buildings that maximized the total
rentable space by using as much of the plot area as possible (Willis, 1995).
Partly as a result of the emergence of skyscrapers, in 1916, New York City
implemented the ﬁrst comprehensive zoning legislation that stated height and
use regulations for all lots in the city. In 1961, New York City implemented
an updated zoning law.
Unlike Chicago, for example, New York has never directly capped the
heights of buildings. Rather the 1916 code created set-back requirements.
That is, buildings had to be set back from the street based on some given
multiple of the street width. The 1961 code put limits on the total building
volume by setting so-called ﬂoor area ratios (FARs) in diﬀerent districts.8
Presumably New York’s response to building height would have implications
for how its skyline developed as compared to Chicago’s.
8The FAR gives total building area as a ratio of the lot size. For example, a FAR of
10 means that total ﬂoor area can be ten times the lot area. Thus, a builder would have
the choice of constructing a 10 story building that covers the entire lot or, say, a 20 story
building that covers half the lot.
10In the 1970s and 1980s, New York implemented three additional programs
that were designed to promote high rise construction. From 1982 to 1988,
a special midtown zoning district was created to encourage development on
the west side of midtown by allowing volume bonuses of up to 20%. In 1977,
the Industrial and Commercial Incentive Board (ICIB) was authorized to
grant tax abatements to businesses if they constructed oﬃces (or hotels) in
New York City. Starting in 1984, the Board was disbanded and the program
became the Industrial and Commercial Incentive Program (ICIP), which pro-
vided business subsidies “as of right,” if the business satisﬁed a certain set
of criteria. In the mid-1990s, the ICIP program was curtailed in Manhattan.
In 1971 the “421-a” program was introduced to provide tax abatements
to building developers for constructing apartments. For builders of rental
units, the builder would qualify for the subsidies if they agreed to charge
rents within New York City’s rent stabilization program. Developers of con-
dominiums could also qualify for the abatements, and the savings could then
be passed to the buyers. The program was curtailed for most of Manhattan
in 1985.
3.3 Chicago’s Zoning
Between 1893 and 1923, Chicago placed direct limits on the height of build-
ings. Table 1 summarizes the building height regulations in New York and
Chicago. In 1893, Chicago imposed a 130 foot limit on the height of buildings
(about 10 stories or 39.5 meters). Several more towers were completed after
1893, since the permits for these building were issued prior to the implemen-
tation. In 1902, the building height limit was doubled to 260 feet; but only
nine years later in 1911, the maximum height was reduced to 200 feet.9
In 1920, a new approach was taken. The height limit was raised again to
260 feet, but builders were also allowed to construct ornamental towers that
could rise to 400 feet (though these towers could not be occupied). Then
in 1923, the height limit was raised to 264 feet and habitable towers were
permitted. Though there was no limit on tower height, they area of the
tower had to be less than 25 percent of the plot area and less than one-sixth
of the volume of the main building. These rules were in eﬀect until 1942. In
9Evidently, the economic interactions between the two cities did not preclude tongue-
and-cheek comments from the New York Times. On March 2, 1902, (page 10), the paper
reported, “That sky-scraper limit [in Chicago] has now positively been ﬁxed at 260 feet,
until some one comes along who wants to a build a taller one.”
11Year
Implemented Chicago New York
1893 1300 (39.6m) limit
1902 2600 (79.2m) limit
1911 2000 (61.0m) limit
1916 Setback multiple
1920 2600 limit + 4000 for tower (total 183m)
1923 2640+tower, with area and volume limits
1942 144×lot size (FAR≈12)
1957 FAR limits + bonus
1961 FAR limits + bonus
Table 1: Building height regulations in Chicago and New York.
that year a more ﬂexible approach to height was implemented. For much of
downtown Chicago, the maximum building volume was capped at the area
of plot times 144 feet. This gave builders the equivalent of a ﬂoor area ratio
of roughly 12. Given the Great Depression and World War II virtually no
skyscrapers were built during this zoning period.
Finally, starting in 1957 the current approach was implemented. Builders
were given ﬂoor area ratio (FAR) caps (a similar set of rules was implemented
in New York, starting in 1961). In downtown Chicago, builders had a FAR
of 16; FAR bonuses were given if builders provided open space around the
building. As in New York, these regulations promoted the boxy towers that
are common today.
Causes and Eﬀects A detailed discussion of why Chicago capped heights,
but not New York, is beyond the scope of this paper.10 However, the pol-
icy decisions made represent the outcome of complex set of “negotiations”
between the interested parties, including, but not limited to, skyscraper de-
velopers, current landlords and businesses, insurance companies, politicians,
engineers, architects, planners and the public at large. Within each city, be-
cause of the diﬀering historical interactions of these groups, and the diﬀering
history, geography and economies of the cites, each place came to a separate
10For a detailed discussion of the history of zoning in Chicago see Schwieterman and
Caspsall (2006). See Weiss (1992) for a history of building height restrictions in New York
and other cities.
12decision about its “preferences” for building height.
Chicago was not alone in its decision to cap it heights. Large, industrial
cities throughout the U.S. placed restrictions on height, since it was seen as
a solution to the various tradeoﬀs associated with skyscrapers (Weiss, 1992).
Generally speaking, the debate about building height related to the tradeoﬀs
involved between promoting the creation of building space and reducing the
externalities it may cause, such as increased congestion and shadows on the
street and surrounding buildings; and the loss of rent revenue by existing
landlords due to either these shadows or the additional square footage put
on the market (Willis, 1996; Weiss, 1992). In addition, aesthetic concerns
also appeared prominently in the debate, as some people viewed skyscrapers
as the architectural embodiment of ugly, partly because they seemed new
and monstrous relative to the buildings they replaced.11 In the early years of
the skyscraper, the history of Chicago’s great ﬁre also contributed to safety
fears about these new types of buildings.12
The question posed here is: To what extent does the evidence suggest that
these building height restrictions had a meaningful impact on the skyline,
itself? In other words, were the height restrictions on the tallest buildings
binding? On one hand, height restrictions can be based on a strong “distaste”
for height, and as such, the city can impose height restrictions to improve city-
wide utility (that is the skyscraper highrise interests might be dominated by
the lowrise interests). On the other hand, the height restrictions themselves,
might simply have been a legal embodiment of what the economic climate
would have generated anyway; that is to say, builders and landlords might
have implemented height restrictions against would be ego-based builders,
who did not care, say about the eﬀects of non-pecuniary motivated height
11Al e t t e rt ot h eChicago News, and reprinted in the New York Times (1895), writes,
“The amendment [to limit heights to 130 feet] was made after a careful investigation
of the subject...and in response to a very general sentiment that the sky-scraper was a
mistake....[E]verybody, save possibly a few blind men, objected to them on the ground of
their ugliness” (p. 14).
12“Chicago, Dec. 17.—No more cloud-pushing buildings will be erected in
Chicago....[T]he Chicago Fire Underwriters’ Association settled the whole thing by adopt-
ing, at its meeting last night, a resolution that all oﬃce buildings of non-combustible
construction should be limited in height...to 120 feet....This means that on buildings of
more than the prescribed height insurance cannot be obtained in any of the companies
composing the Under-writers Association except at a rate premium which is practically
prohibitive.” (New York Times, 1891)
13on the market place. These issues are explored below.13
4 The Determinants of the Skylines
Figure 1 shows skyscraper patterns in New York and Chicago from 1885 to
2007 (data details are given in the Appendix). The top graph shows the
annual number of skyscraper completions and the bottom graph show the
height of the largest building constructed each year (in meters). The ﬁgure
shows that skyscraper building is cyclical in nature. These cycles are in the
order of decades rather than years. For both cities, the peaks and troughs
occur roughly at the same time.
However, despite the large correlations, there are notable diﬀerences be-
tween the two cities. In terms of completions, the late-1920s/early-1930s
and the mid-1980s show the greatest divergences across cities. Evidently the
building boom in Chicago in the 1920s was less dramatic.14 In New York City
t h er i s ei nt h en u m b e ro fc o m p l e t i o n si nt h e1 9 8 0 sa p p e a r st ob ed u e ,i np a r t ,
to the implementation of three programs in New York City: a zoning bonus
to encourage development on the west side of Manhattan’s midtown business
district and generous residential and business tax abatement programs.
L o o k i n ga tt h eh e i g h tg r a p h( b o t t o mo fF i g u r e1 )w ec a ns e et h a tf r o m
about between 1889 and 1966, New York was consistently building taller
buildings than Chicago. From the mid-1960s, interestingly, Chicago and
New York’s tallest buildings have been comparable; this may in part be due
to the similar zoning regulations in eﬀect in the two cities. The peak in
New York around 1930, shows the heights of the Chrysler and Empire State
Buildings. The peaks in the mid-1970s is from the completion of the Twin
Towers in New York and the Sears Tower in Chicago.
13The question on how these skyline restricted or aﬀected urban growth is more complex
to understand since height restrictions may be a response to overbuilding, in addition to
possibly lowering or spreading out future construction. Schultz and Simmons (1959) argue
that to some degree height limitations in Chicago kept down economic growth. They write
that during the height limitations period, “New York could and did building oﬃce buildings
to house the great expansion of business. Some of this business wanted to come to Chicago
and would have if it could have been accommodated there” (pps. 286-287).
14Interestingly, there does not appear to be a detailed accounts for the reasons behind
New York City’s skyscraper building boom in the late 1920s. Despite Clark and Kingston’s
(1929) work on the “rationality” of 63 story skyscrapers, and the handful of height races,
it appears that the building boom was a classic example of a real estate bubble.
14Figure 1: Top Graph: MA(5) of number of skyscraper completions in New
York and Chicago, 1885 to 2007. Bottom Graph: MA(5) of height of tallest
building completed each year in New York and Chicago, 1885 to 2007.
Sources: See Appendix A.
In the post-World War II period both the number of skyscrapers and
the heights of the tallest buildings have not been getting taller, on average
(regression results available upon request). This suggests that there is a
spatial equilibrium process at work. If inter-city interactions are present, it
would appear that, in some sense, it is a zero-sum game. That is to say, if
a city builds extra buildings to attract jobs and population it would then
have this extra building “countered” by the other city, which, in some sense,
would oﬀset the gains that the other city enjoyed.
4.1 Regression Analysis
The purpose of this section is to estimate the determinants of the skyline in
New York and Chicago from 1885 to 2007, with a focus on two variables, the
number of skyscraper completions in the two cities, (1 + ) and the
height of the tallest building completed each year, . H e r ew ec a nt e s t
several hypotheses regarding the two cities:
1. Do economic and policy variables account for a large fraction of sky-
scraper building patterns across the two cities?
152. Are the coeﬃcients that determine the skyline the same or diﬀerent
across the two cities? If diﬀerent, what are the major diﬀerences?
3. Is there evidence of skyscraper market interactions across cities?
4. How have zoning regulations aﬀected the two skylines?
Barr (2010) provides a supply and demand model for both skyscraper
height and the number of completions. Here I brieﬂy describe this model as
it used for a guide for estimation, but the reader is referred to that paper for
more information.
Skyscraper developers aim to maximize proﬁts (or utility) from construc-
tion. The return to construction is the discounted per ﬂoor net rent times
the number of ﬂoors. The cost of construction is assumed to be increasing at
an increasing rate, after some height. Thus the proﬁt maximizing height is
the one that sets the per ﬂoor discounted rent equal to the marginal cost.15
On the demand side, oﬃce-based ﬁrms have a demand for space (height)
as a function of the price (the rental value) and exogenously determined
employment. If we assume that at any given time the current stock of space is
ﬁxed so that the quantity of space supplied is equal to the quantity demanded,
then it can be shown that at any given time the equilibrium height that
developers will supply is a function of measures of the demand for space, the
current stock of space, and the costs of construction (which include the cost
of materials, interest rates and the access to capital, for example).
Furthermore, if we assume that the number of potential skyscraper plots
supplied to the market is a positive function of land values, and land values
are residual proﬁts from construction, then it can be shown, as in Barr (forth-
coming), that the number of completions will be a positive function of the
demand-side variables and negatively related to the cost of construction.16
Lastly, if the relative height of one skyline aﬀects the utility of builders
in the other city, then we would expect to see builders adding extra height to
15It is it likely that rents rise with heights, but, for a given plot size (the types readily
available in New York and Chicago), at some point, they cannot rise faster than marginal
costs and/or elevator banks would likely take up too much space on the lower ﬂoors to
remove the incentive to keep building to the heavens.
16Note that in the regressions below, I do not include measure of land values. Since we
are looking at the height market as a whole we use supply and demand variables instead.
In addition measures of the total value of land in Manhattan and Chicago do not seem to
exist over the entire sample period.
16their building, beyond the proﬁt maximizing amount, so they can maintain
their relative position (or try to strategically jump ahead). Thus if city-wide
strategic interaction, due to “urban pride,”or regional growth is important
we would expect to see the height decisions of one city aﬀecting the height
decisions in the other city.
4.1.1 The Data
Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics of the data set used in this paper.
Appendix A gives the details about the sources and the preparation. To esti-
mate the demand for both height and skyscrapers in general, I have included
the following variables. First is the detrended log of real Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). This variable aims to measure the degree to which growth
above or below the long run trend rate of 3.2% aﬀects skyscrapers. As noted
above, skyscraper development is highly cyclical; the aim of this variable is
to see how much of these cycles are aﬀected by the cyclical component of eco-
nomic growth. A second demand variable is the percent of U.S. employment
in the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) sectors. This is clearly
important since skyscrapers are driven primarily by oﬃce employment.
{Table 2 about here}
I also include two measures of stock market activity which presumably
would aﬀect the demand for skyscrapers. First is the percent change in the
Standard and Poor’s Stock Index (S&P). When the value of the S&P is
increasing, it means ﬁrms are more proﬁt a b l ea n dt h e ya r em o r el i k e l yt ob e
increasing both their demand for oﬃce space, and potentially using some of
those proﬁts to engage in height advertising.
As a second measure, I include the log of average daily volume of the
New York and Chicago stock exchanges, respectively. In theory, the more
trading activity, the more proﬁts will go to ﬁnance-based ﬁrms, who will then
demand more oﬃce space and height.
A ﬁnal demand variable is an estimate of the annual regional populations
in the two cities. We would expect that as the regional population increases,
it will increase land values in the center, which will then increase both the
number of skyscrapers and the height of buildings, cet. par. In sum, for all
of the above-mentioned variables we would expect to see positive coeﬃcients.
In terms of supply side variables, I include the percent change in the
dollar value of real estate loans made each year by commercial banks. This
17is a measure of the supply of construction capital. I also include the real
interest rate as a measure of the cost of capital. To measure construction
costs I include an index of the real value of construction materials. Finally, for
each city I also include the net cumulative number of skyscraper completions
in each city (90 meters or taller for both cities) as a measure of the total stock
of skyscrapers. For interest rates, materials cost and cumulative completions,
we would expect to see negative regression coeﬃcients, but positive ones for
growth in real estate loans. For each city I include dummy variables for the
various zoning regulation regimes discussed above. For zoning variables we
would expect negative signs. For New York’s building incentive programs we
would expect to see positive signs.
I also include measures of the plot sizes. As discussed in Barr (forthcom-
ing; 2010) plot size is an important component of the economics of skyscrap-
ers since it aﬀects both the marginal costs and beneﬁts to height. However, it
m i g h tb ee n d o g e n o u si fb u i l d e r sw h oh a v eap a r t i c u l a rd e s i r et ob u i l dt a l ls e e k
out the extra large plots. In the end, I have included this variable. Despite
its potential endogeneity, the exclusion of the variable seems to be poten-
tially more harmful to the estimation than its inclusion, because of possible
omitted variable bias. Barr (forthcoming) however does not ﬁnd evidence for
plot size endogeneity for New York City. The determinants of plot size are
often out of the control of builders (due to holdouts, unusual plot shapes,
the placement of roads and railroads near some blocks) and thus there is no
strong ap r i o r ireason to assume that endogeneity is a major problem in this
regard.
Also a note is in order about national versus local variables. To the
extent possible, I have aimed to collect city- or regional-speciﬁc variables.
But for some of the demand and supply variables, such local measures are not
available over the entire sample period. While measures of oﬃce employment
and construction costs do exist they tend to be available for the post World
War II period or may be available for some years for one city and not another.
For this reason, I have only included variables that I have been able to obtain
for at least 100 years, which can be local or national in scope.
In addition, national variables can be useful measures. First we are deal-
ing with large cities and as such they are connected to the national economy
and are presumably aﬀected by it; second the variation across regions is of-
ten small relative to the variation across years, i.e., there is high correlation
between US and local measures for a given year; and lastly, using the same
m e a s u r ea l l o w su st os e eh o wt h e ya ﬀect the two cities diﬀerently.
18Finally, for the majority of the variables, the right hand side variables are
lagged two years to account for the lag time in construction. In some cases,
lags of three years provided a better ﬁt of the data; this was the case for
ﬁnance related variables, since presumably ﬁnancing must ﬁrst be arranged
before construction can begin.
4.1.2 Responses to Fundamentals
Table 3 provides the regression results for the log of one plus the number of
completions; Table 4 provides the results for the tallest building completed
in each city.17 The regression results present models of the economic deter-
minants of skyscrapers, while section 4.1.3 below presents results that aim
to measure strategic interaction.
{Table 3 about here}
{Table 4 about here}
Column (1) in each table gives the combined regression for both cities (i.e.,
for a panel of New York and Chicago). In general, the combined regressions
provide a good ﬁtt ot h ed a t a .A l m o s ta l lo ft h ec o e ﬃcients have the expected
signs. We see that, in general, skyscraper building responds positively to
national output and FIRE employment, the growth in real estate loans and
regional population. Skyscraper construction responds negatively to the total
stock and building materials costs. Interestingly, the interest rate is not
strongly negative as one would predict; in the combined regressions, it is
positive. The reason behind this eﬀe c ti sl e f tf o rf u t u r ew o r k . 18
In Table 3, equations (2) and (3) present regressions for just Chicago.
Equation (2) is the number of completions that are 80 meters or taller, and
17Note that for the maximum height regressions, the dependent variable is in levels.
This was done for two reasons. First, since during some years in the period 1933 to 1948
in Chicago no buildings were completed (or at least none that were important enough
to be catalogued on www.emporis.com, www.skyscraperpage.com or in Randall, (1999).
Leaving the variable in levels allows it to be a continuous real value greater or equal to
zero. If I take the log of the variable (or one plus the log), I introduce discontinuities
which might aﬀect estimation. Second, in Barr (forthcoming), in the case of New York, I
ﬁnd that levels appears to better ﬁt the data than logs for average heights .
18Maccini, et al. (2004) show that interest rate regime switches need to be included in
the model to better capture the eﬀect of interest rates on capital investments.
19equation (3) is for buildings that are 90 meters or taller. Generally speaking
t h et w oe q u a t i o n sg i v eb r o a d l yt h es a m er e s u l t s .E q u a t i o n( 4 )i sj u s tf o rN e w
York City.
Comparing the coeﬃcients from say equation (2) and equation (4) sug-
gests that there are some diﬀerences in how the two cities respond to the
underlying economic fundamentals. For example, Chicago seems more re-
sponsive to GDP growth than New York. In general, for costs, population,
stock exchange volume, and real estate loans the estimated coeﬃcient is
larger in New York than in Chicago. For Table 4, we see some similar re-
sults. Chicago’s skyline height is more sensitive to GDP than New York. But
the eﬀect of total stock, materials costs, population and stock volume New
York appears to be more sensitive than Chicago.
Table 5 presents the results of 2 tests, with the null hypothesis that
individual coeﬃcients for Chicago are equal to those of New York City. The
table presents the p-values for the test (so that a p-value of 0.1 or less would
suggest that the coeﬃcients for the two cities are diﬀerent). For the count
equations, we see that most of the variables have diﬀerent coeﬃcients (though
the two ﬁnancing related variables are not diﬀerent). In addition, the evi-
dence suggests that the eﬀe c to fp l o ts i z ei st h es a m e .T h ef a c t o r st h a td r i v e
the height of the tallest building are more likely to be the same in the two
cities, but the eﬀect of plot size is diﬀerent.
4.1.3 Strategic Interaction Eﬀects
To test for interaction eﬀects across cities, I estimate a four equation system
using a seemingly unrelated (SU) regression, where

0
 = {ln(1 + ) ln(1 + ) max max}
In each equation a lagged dependent variable was also included. That is to




−1 +  where 
and  are vectors of coeﬃcients (and  only has non-zero terms along the
main diagonal).
By looking at the correlation across residuals I can investigate the degree
to which non-economic factors from one city aﬀect the other. That it to
say, the variables in each regression allow us to control for the economic
and policy factors that drive skyscraper completions and height in each city.
The residual can thus be interpreted as the non-economic factors that drive
height. If we see a positive correlation, for example, of the residuals from
20one city with the residuals of the other, we can interpret this as a strategic
complementarity eﬀect.
The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable is a way to control for pos-
sible lagged eﬀects in the building decisions. Since the time to completion
can vary several years, the lagged dependent variable is a way to control for
this and other omitted variables. This is important because there may be
similar economic variables driving the skylines of the two cities and if we are
to investigate inter-city eﬀects, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable
would more likely control for unmeasured city-speciﬁce ﬀects that might con-
found inter-city eﬀects. In addition, the inclusion of the lagged dependent
variables remove any serial correlation of the errors that might have been
present in the four dependent variables.
For the sake of brevity, I do not present the results here. They are avail-
able upon request. In general the regressions showed similar results across
speciﬁcations and similar to the OLS models presented in section 4.1.2. In all
cases, the lagged dependent variables are statistically signiﬁcant with greater
than 99% conﬁdence. They added about 2 to 3 percentage points to the total
explanatory power of the regressions. The coeﬃcients range from values of
0.23 to 0.375. The general eﬀect of the lagged dependent variables is to re-
duce the magnitude (in absolute value) of the coeﬃcients and to reduce their
levels of conﬁdence. However, all coeﬃcients retain their signs as compared
to the models without them.
From these regressions I investigated the degree of correlation among the
residuals. In particular, regressions were run to see how the residuals and
their lags of one city aﬀect the residuals of the other (descriptive statistics
of the residuals are available upon request). To ﬁnd a good speciﬁcation for
each equation, I maximized the adjusted R2 (i.e., variables were included if
the t-statistic was greater than one). Table 6 presents the results.
{Table 6 about here}
The regressions show evidence for both positive and negative best re-
sponse functions. For the counts variables, we see that for both cities, the
number of completions responds positively to the count in the other, sug-
gesting that developers see the counts in the other city as a strategic com-
plements.
For the height decisions, we see a bit more complicated picture. New
York’s height appears to negatively respond to Chicago’s height, while, on
21net, Chicago seems to positively respond to New York’s height. Thus for
New York we see evidence of strategic substitutes in regard to height, but for
Chicago we see evidence of strategic complements. Overall the fact all four
equations have at least one positive coeﬃcient from the other city’s variables
suggest the presence of some degree of “skyline competition.”
4.1.4 Restrictions and Height Productivity
Returning to equation (1) of Table 3, the city-speciﬁc dummy variables show
some interesting diﬀerences across the cities (each city-speciﬁc dummy vari-
able is interacted with a city dummy variable, thus each zoning variable,
for example, is interpreted as the eﬀect that of that variable in that city
compared with the other city). In addition, a Chicago dummy variable is in-
cluded as well to capture a general Chicago-wide eﬀect that may be present.
For example, in Table 3, equation (1), shows a positive Chicago eﬀect of
3.88, which suggest, that all else equal, Chicago was actually a much more
productive skyscraper city (if we use 90 meters or greater in the combined
equation the Chicago dummy coeﬃcient only drops to 3.13. Results avail-
able upon request). The introduction of height caps reduced the number of
completions and height of the maximum amount. Equation (1) in table 3
s h o w st h a tz o n i n gr u l e si ne ﬀect in early 1920s (260 foot cap with ornamental
tower) appears to have actually been the most restrictive, as compared to
New York City at the same time. Similarly, equation (1) in Table 4 shows
that, ceteris paribus, Chicago’s tallest buildings were actually 191 meters
(about 16 ﬂoors) taller, on average, than New York City.
In regard to zoning, an F-test shows that the zoning coeﬃcients for
Chicago (from equation (2), Table 3) are jointly diﬀerent than zero. The
F - s t a t i s t i ci sF (7 ,9 5 )=2 . 7 2 ,w i t hap -value of 0.0130. Similarly for equa-
tion (2), table 4, the F-stat. for the zoning coeﬃcients is F( 7, 95) = 1.98,
with a p-value of 0.066. These results would suggest that in general zoning
restrictions in Chicago had real economic consequences, and were not simply
legal manifestations of the economic heights of the time.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has investigated the market for skyscrapers in New York City
and Chicago from 1885 to 2007. The aim of the work is to compare and
22contrast the annual time series for the number of skyscraper completions and
the height of the tallest building completed in each city. Despite the large
number of historical and architectural accounts of skyscrapers in these two
cities, no work in economics has explored how economic and policy variables
have shaped the skylines of the two cities.
This paper aims to investigate the degree to which each city’s skylines
were shaped by diﬀering local factors versus diﬀering levels in economic fun-
damentals. For example, does Chicago have fewer skyscrapers because it has
a smaller population or does it have a lower response to changes in popula-
tion? The evidence here suggests that the answer is both. Comparing the
general responsiveness to fundamentals shows that, on net, Chicago’s build-
ing activity is less responsive to the same underlying economic fundamentals.
On the demand side, Chicago is more responsive than New York with
changes in GDP. It is equally responsive to changes in FIRE employment; but
less responsive to changes in stock market activity and population. On the
supply side, Chicago is less responsive to building costs and total completed
stock, which would suggest less cyclicality in its building patterns, and hence
more possible construction in Chicago during some periods. In sum, New
York and Chicago appear to have signiﬁcant diﬀerences in how they respond
t ot h es a m ee c o n o m i cf a c t o r s .
We also see an important eﬀect from zoning regulations. Unlike New
York, Chicago experimented with height caps in late-19th and early-20th
centuries. The results show that these restrictions were, on balance, binding
and that they signiﬁcantly reduced Chicago’s skyline as compared to New
York.
Lastly, I ﬁnd evidence of height competition across cities. I run a seem-
ingly unrelated regression system with lagged dependent variables, and in-
vestigate the correlations among the residuals across the cities to provide evi-
dence of strategic interaction. In essence I estimate the “non-economic” best
response functions. The results provide evidence of both negative and posi-
tive reaction functions (strategic substitutes and complements respectively).
For example New York City completions are shown to positively respond
to both Chicago’s completions and height, while Chicago’s completions are
shown to respond positively to New York’s count but, on net, negatively
to New York’s height. We see that New York’s height responds negatively
to Chicago’s height, but Chicago responds positively to New York’s height.
This is line with the “Second City” hypothesis: that Chicago feels the need
to keep up with New York.
23More broadly, these dual responses most likely reﬂect the trade-oﬀsi n -
volved with skyscraper development. On one hand increasing the quantity of
space in one city will reduce the price of space and therefore will likely lead
to negative best responses by the other city (a la a Cournot model). But
on the other hand, if builders in each city aim to out-do each other, either
due to ego considerations or a need to advertize their respective cities, one
would expect to see a positive reaction function. The fact that both elements
appear to exist side by side would suggest that more research is needed to
parse out the speciﬁc nature of these interactions.
This work here is but a ﬁrst attempt to understand the causes and con-
sequences of skyscrapers in the United States. Since the economics of sky-
scrapers remains an understudied area, there are many possible extensions
for future work. One area includes how the number and density of skyscrap-
ers has aﬀected the growth of cities over the 20th century. Relatedly, further
work can investigate the degree to which height restrictions in various cities
have (a) altered the spatial distribution of economic activity within the cities
and (b) have impacted economic growth in these cities. Future work can also
look at the impact of technological change on the economics of skyscrapers.
No work to date has directly investigated how the evolution of new building
methods and materials has aﬀected the market for height. The work here
can also be expanded to include more cities to see if there is evidence of
multi-city competition with regard to skyscraper height.
24A Data Sources and Preparation
• Completions, Maximum Heights and Net Cumulative Completions: skyscrap-
erpage.com and emporis.com (year of demolitions were found from NY Times
or Randall (1999)).
• Plot Size: New York City: http://gis.nyc.gov/doitt/nycitymap/ and various
editions of the New York Land Books. Chicago: Sanborn Fire Insurance
Maps and http://maps.cityofchicago.org/kiosk/mpkiosk.jsp.
• Detrended GDP: Annual real GDP is from Johnston and Williamson (2010).
ln(Real GDP) was regressed on the year. The residual of this regression is
the variable used.
• GDP Deﬂator: 1890-2007: Johnston and Williamson (2010).
• Percent of national employment in FIRE: 1900-1970: F.I.R.E. data from
Table D137, Historical Statistics. Total (non farm) Employment: Table
D127, Historical Statistics. 1971-2007: F.I.R.E. data from BLS.gov Series Id:
CEU5500000001 “Financial Activities.” Total nonfarm employment 1971-
2007 from BLS.gov Series Id:CEU0000000001. The earlier and later employ-
ment tables were joined by regressing overlapping years that were available
from both sources of the new employment number on the old employment
numbers and then correcting the new number using the OLS equation; this
process was also done with the FIRE data as well. 1890-1899: For both the
F.I.R.E. and total employment, values were extrapolated backwards using
the growth rates from the decade 1900 to 1909, which was 4.1% for F.I.R.E.
and 3.1% for employment.
• Index of Real Materials Costs: Construction Cost Index: 1947-2007: Bureau
of Labor Statistics Series Id: WPUSOP2200 “Materials and Components
for Construction” (1982=100). 1890-1947: Table E48 “Building Materials.”
Historical Statistics (1926=100). To join the two series, the earlier series
was multiplied by 0.12521, which is the ratio of the new series index to the
old index in 1947. The Real index was create by dividing the construction
cost index by the GDP Deﬂator for each year.
• Regional Populations: U.S. Census Bureau. For New York: Population
included 5 boroughs of NYC, Nassau, Suﬀolk, Westchester, Hudson and
Bergen counties. For Chicago, population was from Cook, DuPage, Kane,
25Lake, Will and Lake (Ind.) counties. Annual data is generated by estimat-
ing the annual population via the formula  = −1 where  is the
census/data year, i.e.,  ∈ {1890190020002007}is the year, and 
is solved from the formula,  = −110∗.
• % Change in Real Estate Loans: 1896-1970: Table X591, “Real Estate Loans
for Commercial Banks.” Historical Statistics. 1971-2007: FDIC.gov Table
CB12, “Real Estate Loans FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks.” The two
series were combined without any adjustments. For 1885-1895: Values are
generated by forecasting backwards based on an (3) regression of the
percent change in real estate loans from one year to the next.
• % Change in Standard and Poor’s Stock Index: Historical Statistics of United
States, Millenial Edition; yahoo.com
• Real Interest Rates. Nominal interest rate: 1890-1970: Table X445 “Prime
Commercial Paper 4-6 months.” Historical Statistics. 1971-1997 http://www.federalreserve.gov,
1998-2007: 6 month CD rate. 6 month CD rate was adjusted to a CP rate
by regressing 34 years of overlapping data of the CP rate on the CD rate
and then using the predicted values for the CP rate for 1997-2007. Inﬂation
is the percentage change in the GDP deﬂator.
• Stock Exchange Volumes: New York: http://www.nyse.com/. Chicago: Pa-
lyi (1937/1975) and various SEC Annual reports.
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30Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. # Obs.
New York Skyscrapers
Max Height (m) 158.34 78.45 18.0 417.0 125
Completions 6.64 7.70 0.0 37.0 125
Net Total Completions 278.80 247.28 1.0 814.0 120
Avg. Plot Size (sq. feet) 43,820 36,564 5,198 241,478 98
Plot size of max. 59,743 105,480 1,787 681,600 123
Chicago Skyscrapers
Max height (m) 116.55 84.52 0.00 442.30 125
Completions (80m+) 3.93 4.93 0.00 23.00 125
Completions (90m+) 2.87 4.02 0.00 18.00 125
Net Total Completions (90m+) 94.98 103.69 1.00 354.00 125
Avg. Plot Size (80m+) 41,244 22,369 9,000 143,828 73
Avg. Plot (90m+) 47,569 30,926 9,000 212,137 62
Plot size of max 45,719 44,601 4,080 282,492 112
U.S. Variables
ln(RGDP) Detrended 0.00 0.12 -0.47 0.20 123
FIRE Emp./Emp. (%) 4.52 1.42 1.94 6.57 118
Real Material Cost Index 1.22 0.25 0.82 1.61 124
%∆US Real Estate Loans 8.22 8.43 -19.10 42.17 117
%∆S&P Index 6.37 18.05 -48.50 49.90 123
Real Interest Rates (%) 2.25 4.81 -14.76 19.57 123
New York Economic Variables
Regional Population (M) 11.10 4.09 3.09 16.00 123
Zoning Dummy (1916-1960) 0.36 125
NYSE Volume (B) 36.66 100.04 0.033 532.02 120
Zoning Dummy (1961-2007) 0.38 124
Zoning Bonus Dummy (1982-1988) 0.06 124
Tax Abatements Dummy (1971-1985) 0.12 124
ICIP Dummy (1977-1992) 0.13 124
Chicago Economic Variables
Regional Population (M) 5.19 2.33 1.00 8.59 124
Chi. Ex. Stock Volume (B) 1.79 5.50 0.0002 30.13 116
Cap 130’ Dummy (1893-1901) 0.07 125
Cap 260’ Dummy (1902-1910) 0.07 125
Cap 200’ Dummy (1911-1919) 0.07 125
Cap 260’/400’ Dummy (1920-1922) 0.02 125
Cap 264’/Tower Dummy (1923-1941) 0.15 125
Limit 144×PlotDummy (1942-1956) 0.12 125
FAR Limits Dummy (1956-2007) 0.42 125
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics. See Appendix for sources. 31(1) (2) (3) (4)





























































NYC Zoning Bonus−2 059
(29)∗∗ 056
(24)∗
































































Observations 227 113 113 114
2 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85
¯ 2 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.82
Durbin Watson Stat. 1.19 1.27 1.67
Table 3: Regression Results for Number of Skyscraper Completions , 1885-
2007 (dep. var is (1 + )). Eq. (1) includes robust standard errors,
Eqs. (2)-(4) include Newey-West standard errors. ∗Stat. Sig. at 95% level;





























































N Y CZ o n i n g1 9 1 6D u m m y −2 −492
(21)∗ −618
(21)∗




Chi Zoning 130−2 −389
(23)∗ −100
(06)




Chi Zoning 200−2 −909
(25)∗ −451
(08)




Chi Zoning 264+tower−2 −1022
(23)∗ −495
(06)
Chi Zoning plot×144−2 −1156
(27)∗∗ −1051
(11)














Observations 227 113 114
2 0.62 0.67 0.63
¯ 2 0.58 0.62 0.57
Durbin Watson 1.48 1.57
Table 4: Regression Results for Height of Tallest Building (in levels), 1885-
2007. ∗Stat. Sig. at 95% level; ∗∗Stat. Sig. at 99% level. See Appendex for
sources.
33Variable Count Height
ln(RGDP Detrend)−2 0.03 0.04
ln(F.I.R.E.)−2 0.95 0.84
ln(Total Stock)−2 0.00 0.00
ln(Materials Costs)−2 0.00 0.20
ln(Stock Volume)−2 0.00 0.00
ln(Metro Pop)−2 0.00 0.04
%∆RE Loans−3 0.28 0.89
%∆S&P Index−3 0.03 0.13
Real Rates−3 0.21 0.14
ln(Plot Size) 0.21 0.01
Table 5: Results of chi-squared tests on the equality of coeﬃcients. p-values
are given for null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients for the two cities are equal.
The ﬁrst column is from Table 5, equations (2) and (4). The second column
is from Table 6, equations (2) and (3).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NYC Chicago NYC Chicago





































Observations 112 112 112 112
2 0.23 0.31 0.22 0.32
¯ 2 0.21 0.28 0.19 0.29
Table 6: All variables are residuals from the SUR. t-statistics below estimates.
robust t-statistics. ∗S t a t .s i g .a t5 % ;∗∗Stat. sig. at 1%.
34